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IN THE NAME OF TREATMENT:




In August, 1956, Kenneth Donaldson, a 48-year-old carpenter from Cam-
den, New Jersey, went to Florida to visit his 80-year-old parents. A few months
later, he began to feel unusually tired, and told his father that someone might
have put a sedative in his food. He had a basis for such a fear, since, a few years
earlier, he had become drowsy after eating lunch at a diner he frequented, and
laboratory tests on his urine disclosed the presence of a large amount of codeine;
Donaldson, a Christian Scientist, had not been taking medication that contained
codeine. Donaldson's father filed a petition requesting that his son be committed
to a mental hospital. Donaldson was taken to the county jail, where he received
an examination that lasted less than two minutes from two physicians who
were not psychiatrists. On the basis of this examination, the doctors concluded
that Donaldson was a paranoid schizophrenic.
Shortly thereafter, a commitment hearing before a county judge was held.
The hearing was completed in a matter of minutes. The judge agreed with the
doctors' diagnosis and committed Donaldson to Florida State Hospital. This
action violated Florida law, which limited involuntary commitment to persons
resident in Florida for at least one year, whereas Donaldson had been in Florida
for only four months. The examining physicians had erroneously reported that
Donaldson had been in Florida for four years.
Donaldson was confined in Florida State Hospital for over 14 years. For
religious reasons, he refused medication and ECT (electroshock therapy) and
his wishes were honored. He was given little other treatment. He was allowed
to speak to a psychiatrist for only three hours in 14 years; he was denied grounds
privileges and occupational therapy. Yet the hospital continued to confine him,
reasoning that he was mentally ill because he believed (1) that he had been in
Florida for only four months prior to commitment, (2) that someone had put
codeine in his food, and (3) that he was not mentally ill.'
In 1971, Donaldson sued his attending physicians for denying him treat-
ment in violation of his constitutional rights. A jury awarded him $38,500
damages, and the Fifth Circuit upheld the verdict, reasoning that if "the 'pur-
pose' of commitment is treatment, and treatment is not provided, then the
'nature' of the commitment bears no 'reasonable relation' to its 'purpose,' and
the Constitutional rule [requiring due process] is violated." 2 The court declared
* Law clerk to Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman, United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. The views expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily
reflect the views of any court or judge.
1 These facts are taken from B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY 83 et seq. (1972), a
book written by one of Donaldson's lawyers, and from the opinion in Donaldson v. O'Connor,
493 F.2d 507, 511-14 (5th Cir. 1974).
2 493 F.2d at 521.
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that "a person involuntarily civilly committed to a state mental hospital has a
constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a
reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition."3 This
holding is now being considered by the Supreme Court.
The Donaldson opinion is troubling for several reasons. First, it does not
deal with the fact that Donaldson probably should not have been committed at
all. Besides ignoring the summary nature of Donaldson's commitment hearing,
the opinion does not discuss why the state should have the power to confine a
man whom no one thought dangerous,4 and who was not totally out of touch
with reality.5 Second, by holding Donaldson's attending physicians liable for
failure to treat him, the court makes it likely that mental hospitals, in order not
to be liable for not providing treatment, will in the future force such modes of
treatment as tranquilizers and ECT upon patients who, as Donaldson did, refuse
them. The Donaldson opinion leaves unsettled the extent of the state's power to
commit those deemed to be suffering from mental illness and the extent of the
involuntarily committed patient's right to refuse treatment.
This article deals with these problems. The first section is factual: The
diagnosis of mental illness is discussed to show that such diagnosis may be unreli-
able. The different forms of treatment for mental illness are then discussed in
order to demonstrate both their limited effectiveness and their effect on the
patient's beliefs and ability to think. It is shown that, whatever form of treatment
may be used, confinement in a hospital may aggravate rather than cure mental
illness. Finally, the workings of the commitment process in practice are explored
to show why many people are committed who do not resemble the stereotype of
the psychotic.
The second two portions of the article are legal: There is an extended dis-
cussion of the way in which and the extent to which the courts have given con-
stitutional protection to individual autonomy. Commitment and forced treat-
ment infringe the area of autonomy protected by the Constitution. The way in
which the courts have dealt with the problems of the state's power to commit and
the patients' right to refuse treatment is next examined.
Finally, recommendations are made in the conclusion as to how the courts
should, based on the previous parts of the article, deal with these problems in the
future. More important, however, than the article's specific recommendations
are its presentation of facts which anyone attempting to make a realistic decision
on the power to commit or the right to refuse treatment must consider and its
exposition of a constitutional framework within which a court can implement
such decisions.
II. Diagnosis and Treatment for Mental Illness
"Illness" and "treatment" are terms which the psychiatrist borrows from
3 Id. at 520.
4 Id. at 517.
5 B. ENNIS, supra note 1, at 87, describes him as "intelligent and articulate" and notes




the medical profession.' A growing number of psychiatrists and psychologists
argue that the application of these concepts to psychiatry may be dangerously
misleading, because it obscures vital differences between medical and mental
ailments.' Others disagree and believe that most of the psychoses will be traced
to physical abnormalities in the brain.' Both would agree that we know far less
today about psychoses than we do about diseases like smallpox.
Many if not most physical ailments are classified on the basis of their
etiology. Smallpox is considered a separate, discrete disease because it is caused
by a discrete microorganism and not because all smallpox sufferers have the
same symptoms, for this is not true of diseases like syphilis. Because we are igno-
rant about the etiology of most mental disorders, the classifications we use, such as
paranoid schizophrenic, are shorthand descriptions of syndromes of behavior.'
The cause of this syndrome is unknown; indeed, the syndrome may have several
possible causes and thus represent several diseases, much as the syndrome of
"red spots on one's body" is now known to represent smallpox, chicken pox, and
measles. Furthermore, because the etiology of mental diseases is unknown, a
determination of whether a person is mentally ill, and what illness he has, must
be made solely from an observation of his behavior and of his feelings as he re-
ports them. One can make a bacterial culture to test for certain physical diseases
because their etiology is known, but this cannot be done for mental illness.
Some commentators conclude that "mental illness may be more usefully con-
sidered to be a social status than a disease, since the symptoms of mental illness
are vaguely defined ... ."" Even if we assume that there are some mental illnesses
which in future will be shown to be caused by brain abnormality, the fact that
present-day classifications of mental illness represent descriptions of behavior that
6 "Illness" originally meant a "bad moral quality" or "wickedness" and "depravity."
OxFoRD EINGLISH DICTIONARY. Mental illness still retains some of this connotation.
7 This argument is made in many books and articles, including T. SCHEFF, BEING MEN-
TALLY ILL (1966); T. SZASZ, IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY 12-24- (1970); Albee, Emerging Con-
cepts of Mental Illness, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 870 (1969); Leifer, The Medical Model as
Ideology, 9 INT'L J. PSYCHIAT. 13 (1970). Much of the following discussion benefits from
their ideas.
Observations paralleling those in the following discussion on the nature of classification
of mental illness have also been made in the law reviews. See Blinick, Mental Disability, Legal
Ethics, and Professional Responsibility, 33 ALBANY L. REV. 92, 94-95 (1968); Swartz, Com-
pulsory Legal Measures and the Concept of Illness, 19 S.C. L. Rav. 372, 376-78 (1967); Note,
Psychiatrists' Role in Determining Accountability for Crimes, 52 MARQ. L. Rv. 380, 382-84
(1969). Cf. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 803 '(1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting): "San-
ity and insanity are concepts of incertitude. They are given varying and conflicting content at
the same time and from time to time by specialists in the field."
8 See S. MARK & R. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN (1970). I have also profited
from a discussion with Dr. Robert J. Wyman of Yale University.
9 Thus, in AN INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 322 (Rech & Moore eds. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Rech & Moore], Dr. Henry Payson states before describing a classification
of depressive illnesses:
Each of the various syndromes described below refers to a group of signs and
symptoms that often, but not always, occur together. Some of the names imply an
explanation of the cause of the syndrome. In fact, the etiology, or causal mechanism,
is not known .... fMlodern studies . . .are still in a descriptive rather than an ex-
planatory phase.
A similar point is made in R. MONROE, SCHOOLS OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THOUGHT 297 (1955).
10 SCHEFF, supra note 7, at 128. Diverse views of the "labelling theory" of mental illness
are expressed in the following articles: Gove, The Labelling Theory of Mental Illness: A Reply
to Scheff, 40 Am. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 242 (1975); Scheff, Reply, 40 Am. SOCIOLOGICAL REV.
252 (1975).
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tacitly assume an undiscovered cause has important implications. For one thing,
it means that a diagnosis of mental illness is more likely to be erroneous than one
of physical illness. If a patient expresses irrational fears, it is difficult to tell
whether these anxieties represent a short-term reaction to environmental stress,
which reaction will disappear within a few weeks, or the beginnings of a con-
dition that will lead to much more bizarre behavior in the future. The psychiatrist
cannot take a blood test or (in most cases) an X ray; since the causes of paranoia
are not understood, it becomes harder to tell whether they are responsible for a
given symptom. This is not to say that diagnosis is impossible, for there are
accurate diagnoses of diseases with unknown etiologies, such as cancer. It does
mean that one should not put complete faith in a diagnosis, and that one's skep-
ticism should increase the shorter the time span over which the symptoms are
observed. This fact should be given even more weight since it has been suggested
that many psychiatrists believe that "judging a sick person well is more to be
avoided than judging a well person sick."11
Another result of the lack of knowledge of the causal mechanism of mental
disorder is that no behavior of an individual is inconsistent with the hypothesis
that the individual is mentally ill. If a person has influenza, recovers and remains
in perfect health for ten years, we know enough about the influenza virus to
recognize that the virus is not still in his bloodstream. But if a patient manifests
paranoia and then appears perfectly normal for a decade, this does not prove that
the forces that caused the first attack of irrational fear are not still present, about
to precipitate another incident. This means that a person who has been wrongly
diagnosed will find it very hard to demonstrate the error. 2
Furthermore, since so little is known about the causes of mental illness, there
is a tendency to assume that any gross deviance from moral or societal norms
has an organic cause or is, in some sense, a mental disorder." Thus, homosexual-
11 Id. at 105. These conclusions are bolstered by New York's experience following the
Supreme Court decision in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), granting due process to
prisoners committed to mental hospitals. Nine hundred sixty-seven patients who had been con-
fined in two hospitals for the criminally insane, having been judged too dangerous for ordinary
mental hospitals, were transferred to ordinary mental hospitals. A study made four and a half
years later showed that less than three percent were returned to the hospitals of the criminally
insane, about 20 percent were involved in some sort of assaultive incident, and 49 percent were
released (although a few of these were readmitted). The author concludes that there is a
"tendency to institutionalize many people who are not dangerous, rather than to inadvertently
release the very few that are." Steadman, Implications from the Baxstrom Experience, 1 BULL.
Avr. AcAD. PSYcHIAT. & LAW 189, 193. A similar point is made in Wexler et al., The Adminis-
tration of Psychiatric justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 Amz. L. Rav. 1, 98-99
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Wexler]. A discussion both of the difficulties of predicting danger-
ousness and of psychiatrists' propensity to predict dangerousness may be found in Schreiber,
Indeterminate Therapeutic Incarceration of Dangerous Criminals, 56 VA. REv. 602, 618-21
(1970).
12 Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 ScIeNcz 250 '(1973) reports a study
in which the experimenters went to 12 different mental hospitals complaining of hearing voices
saying "empty" and "hollow." Although no such psychotic symptoms had ever been reported
in psychiatric literature, all 12 hospitals admitted the "pseudopatients." Upon admission, the
pseudopatients behaved as normally as possible. None of the hospitals detected their mistake-
the pseudopatients were discharged, on average, 19 days later, as "in remission"-in other
words, their illness was thought to have abated temporarily.
13 Thus, Albee, supra note 7, at 872, points out that "we diagnose a mental disease when
we observe an individual disregarding the property rights of others, as for example, the ado-
lescent who steals cars. .. ." Leifer, supra note 7, at 17, asserts that the "concept of mental
illness is . .. used to justify the detention and 'correction' of persons whose behavior is dis-
[Vol. 50: 808)
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ity and other unusual sexual practices have been thought to be evidence of
neuroses.1
4
Finally, the use of the concept of illness tends to make psychiatrists forget
the possibility that for many patients who manifest personality disorders, espe-
dally those which fall short of psychosis, it may be much more fruitful to pay at-
tention to "the hostile and damaging forces in his world"'" rather than to seek
the cause of his disorder in his brain. Many of the current advocates of psycho-
surgery make this mistake."
A. Chemotherapy
The drugs most often used to treat mental disorders may be classified into
major tranquilizers, minor tranquilizers and antidepressants." Major tranquil-
izers, such as chlorpromazine "have been responsible for revolutionary changes in
the treatment of psychotic disorders."'" They "have a significant salutary effect
on a wide range of schizophrenic symptoms, including thought disturbance,
paranoid symptoms, delusions, social withdrawal, loss of self-care, anxiety, and
agitation."' 9 Although they do not interfere with the intellect if the correct
dosage is given,2" they will affect behavior of psychotics: "Combativeness disap-
pears, and relaxation and cooperativeness become prominent,"'" and, at least at
first, there is also "emotional quieting, and affective indifference."' 2 The proper
administration of tranquilizers like chlorpromazine requires the close supervision
of a physician, because the therapeutic dosage varies widely among different
patients and even over time for the same patient.22 Further, the drugs will not be
fully effective if the physician doles them out impersonally; he must "communi-
cate his interest in the patient," lest the medicine "be perceived as a rejection,
and much of the potential benefit of the medication will be nullified."' 4 More gen-
turbing . . . or unusual." SCHEFF, supra note 7, at 35-38, points to subtler societal norms,
such as the taboo against mental emigration to an inward fantasy world when in public; and
claims that we define what behavior qualifies as mental illness by whether it violates a social
norm. Id. at 25. R. D. Laing also states that "sanity or psychosis is tested by the degree of
conjunction or disjunction between two persons where the one is sane by common consent."
TnE DIVIED SELF 36 (1959). The writings of many psychosurgeons also suggest a tendency
to enforce societal and moral norms. See text accompanying note 68, infra.
14 See H. FENICHEL, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS (1945) for a state-
ment of the "orthodox" Freudian position. See In re Sealy, 218 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1969) (adju-
dication of incompetency reversed as based solely on Sealy's hippie lifestyle).
15 Albee, supra note 7, at 870.
16 Thus, MARx & ERVIN, supra note 8, at 4, suggest that the patient's brain be given
primacy because education and environment affect the patient's behavior because they affect
his brain; "no matter from what point we start, we always come back to that organ's primary
importance." This neglects the fact that it might be more fruitful to consider changing the
environment. See also text accompanying note 67, infra.
17 See Rech & Moore, supra note 9, at 290.
18 THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 167 (4th ed. Goodman & Gilman eds.
1970) [hereinafter cited as Goodman & Gilman].
19 Id.
20 Rech & Moore, supra note 9, at 299.
21 Goodman & Gilman at 167.
22 Id. at 156. Greater sedative effects on patients given major tranquilizers have been
noted by empirical studies of mental hospitals, such as Wexler, supra note 11, at 203. This
suggests that many hospitals may give too high a dose in order to make the patients man-
ageable.
23 Rech & Moore at 305.
24 Id. at 305-06.
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erally, the drugs do not provide a cure; though, by alleviating the thought dis-
orders characteristic of psychosis, they may make a cure possible." Finally,
because of their potentially serious side effects, at least one author recommends
that they be used for psychoses only.26
Minor tranquilizers, such as Valium, are useless for treating psychoses, but
relieve "excessive anxiety" of neurotics." These drugs often cause "[i]mpairment
of ego function and intellectual abilities, as well as somnolence." '28
Antidepressant drugs are useful in the treatment of many types .of depres-
sion," especially where prolonged depression has caused biochemical changes
in the brain." As with the major tranquilizers, the need for individualized treat-
ment appears to be important because there are many different types of anti-
depressants, and different patients, as well as the same patient at different times,
respond differently to each.' Also, the tendency to adverse side effects varies
from patient to patient. 2 They may cause behavioral changes or intellectual
impairment if given to normal persons,"3 and needless to say produce mood
changes in depressed patients.3"
B. ECT
"Electroshock Therapy is a technique by which a current of from 70 to
130 volts of electricity is permitted to flow through the patient's brain, causing a
convulsion equivalent to an epileptic seizure."' 5 The convulsion is so violent that
bone fractures often result," although muscle-paralyzing drugs have lowered that
risk. ECT has beneficial antidepressant effects in some, but not all, types of
depression;3 7 its benefits are less well established in other psychoses.38 Despite this,
a few hospitals use ECT for all disorders because it is cheap and renders the
patient "noncombative, pliable, and above all, forgetful"; ECT is also sometimes
used as punishment for disruptive patients.3 "
There has been major controversy over whether ECT causes permanent
brain damage. That ECT impairs memory at least temporarily is admitted by
25 Id. at 294-96.
26 Id. at 299. The side effects are described at 299-301, and in Goodman & Gilman at
165-67.
27 Rech & Moore at 309.
28 Id. at 307.
29 For a review of over 100 clinical studies done on these drugs, see Morris & Beck, Effi-
cacy of Antidepressant Drugs, 30 Ancir. GEN. PSYCnIAT. 667 (1974).
30 Rech & Moore at 329.
31 Morris & Beck, supra note 29, at 671.
32 Goodman & Gilman, supra note 18, at 185, 189.
33 Id. at 183, 187.
34 Id.
35 Health and Hosps. Corp. v. Stein, 70 Misc. 2d 944, 945, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463-64
(Sup. Ct. 1972).
36 See Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953) (both legs broken; malprac-
tice suit dismissed).
37 Rech & Moore, supra note 9. at 323-26.
38 See Furlong, Mythology of ECT, 13 COMPR. PSYCHnAT. 235 (1972); Wells, ECT for
Schizophrenia, 14 Compa. PSYcHIAT. 291, 297 (1973) (ECT viewed as bringing symptom
relief, not cure).
39 Robitscher, Psychosurgery and Other Somatic Means of Altering Behavior, 2 BuLL.
AM. AcAD. PsYcHIAT. & LAW 7, 12-13. Even if these allegations are hard to prove, the fact
remains that ECT is ideally suited to these purposes.
[Vol. 50: 808]
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all; some have suggested that this is the basis of its therapeutic effects. 40 Some
clinical studies found that the impairment disappears after a few days.4 How-
ever, a more recent study using more careful controls, a larger sample, and a
sample that was given more ECT treatments than in previous studies, found that
the "significantly greater error scores" of the ECT as contrasted with the control
group on both memory and perception tests given "after a relatively long time
period since the last course of treatment suggest that ECT causes irreversible
brain damage.' 42 This is especially significant in the light of an earlier sugges-
tion43 that ECT works in the same way as a lobotomy does. The danger of brain
damage is heightened by the fact, shown by a 1971 study,44 that many ECT
machines now in use are defective and deliver excessive voltage.
C. Psychosurgery
In 1937, Dr. Egas Moniz of Portugal discussed the operation he had in-
vented a year earlier, the lobotomy, in which the frontal lobes of the brain are
removed or severed.45 It is, he said, "a simple operation, always safe, which may
prove to be an effective surgical treatment in certain cases of mental disorder. 46
He emphasized that lobotomy is "not prejudicial to either physical or psychic life
of the patient."47 In the next twenty years, 50,000 lobotomies were performed. 8
The lobotomy declined in popularity as new tranquilizers were discovered.49
Later studies on those lobotomized proved Moniz's claims wrong. A follow up of
229 lobotomies done in Pennsylvania concluded that the operation resulted in
"impaired memory, diminished . ..sexual contacts, . . . a change in attitude
toward one's self, increased repression and suppression of reflective thought" 5 0-
in stronger terms, the creation of "semivegetables."'' The Pennsylvania study
also suggests that the lobotomies did not even help the disorders for which they
were performed, since only 19 percent of the lobotomized patients were dis-
charged.
52
Psychosurgery2 today is more refined. Stereotaxic devices enable surgeons to
40 Rech & Moore, supra note 9, at 335, analogizes these effects to "the antidepressant
effects of alcohol." The way in which ECT works is not known with certainty.
41 See e.g., Miller, Effects of ECT, 43 BR. J. MED. PSYCHIAT. 57 (1970).
42 Goldman, Gomer, & Templer, Long-Term Effects of ECT upon Memory, 28 J. CLIN.
PSYCHOL. 32, 33 (1972).
43 Roth & Garside, Some Characteristics Common to ECT and Prefrontal Leucotomy, 3
J. NEUROPSYCHIAT. 221 (1965).
44 Davies et al., ECT Instruments, 25 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 97 (1971).
45 When the nerves are severed but not actually removed the technical term is prefrontal
leucotomy. See Robitscher, supra note 39, at 15.
46 Moniz, 93 Am. J. PSYCHIAT. 1379, 1385 (1937).
47 Id. at 1379.
48 The estimate of 50,000 comes from Breggin, The Return of Lobotomy and Psychosur-
gery, 118 CONG. R c. 5567, 8167-68, 8260-61 (1972) and is also cited in Holden, Psycho-
surgery: Legitimate Therapy or Laundered Lobotomy, 179 SciENcE 1109 (1973) and
Robitscher, supra note 39, at 15. The figure is for the United States alone.
49 Robitscher, supra note 39, at 15; Holden, supra note 48, at 1109.
50 Vosburg, Ldbotomy in Western Pennsylvania: Looking Backward over Ten Years, 119
Ame. J. PsYcHIT. 503, 508 (1962).
51 Holden, supra note 48, at 1109.
52 Vosburg, supra note 50, at 504.
53 Defined as the destruction or removal of brain tissue for the purpose of treating a mental
disorder.
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focus much more precisely on small areas of the brain.5" Of course, "[t]he trouble
is there is still no conclusive evidence correlating specific brain structures with
specific behavior."5
In the past decade, interest in psychosurgery has been rising and a new wave
of psychosurgery appears to have begun. 8 Editorials have appeared in Lancet"
and the Journal of the American Medical Association," and numerous articles
report on the work of psychosurgeons throughout the country and the world.5 9
At present, some 400 to 600 psychosurgical operations are performed each year in
the United States.6"
Several characteristics of this new wave should be noted. Unlike the first
wave of lobotomies, the newer operations are performed for mental disorders
which are not traditionally classified as psychotic. Psychosurgery has been per-
formed in the United States for anxiety, depression, tension and alcoholism.6"
It is increasingly used both in the United States and other countries for hyper-
active children as (in the words of Orlando Andy, the American surgeon most
involved in this area) "preferable to... having a child with abnormal behavior
continue under inadequate control during the formative and developmental
years of his life."6
54 An illustrated description is found in MARK & ERVIN, supra note 8.
55 Holden, supra note 48, at 1109. See also the statement of Dr. Brown, the Director of
National Institute of Mental Health, in Hearings on Quality of Health Care Before Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 341, 344 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings].
56 Breggin, supra note 48, is the most comprehensive general survey of this new wave.
Other general surveys are contained in Washington, John Doe's Dilemma: Legal Resistance to
Psychosurgery, 5 N.C. CENT. L.J. 97 (1973) and Symposium, Psychosurgery, 54 B.U. L. Rv.
215 (1974).
57 2 LANCET 69 (1972), which was favorable to the new psychosurgery and which was
answered by critical letters in 2 LANCET 185 and 434 (1972).
58 226 J.A.M.A. 779 (1973).
59 Some of these articles, which will be discussed in greater detail below, and the number
of patients operated on, are:
Andy, Thalamotomy in Hyperactive and Aggressive Behavior, 32 CONFiN. NEUROL. 322
(1970) (Mississippi, 5); Andy et al., Behavioural Changes Correlated with Thalamotomy
Site, 36 CONFIN. NEUROL. 106 (1974) (Mississippi, 34); Ballantine et al., Stereotaxic
Anterior Cingulotomy for Neuropsychiatric Illness and Intractable Pain, 26 3. NEUROSURG.
488 (1967) (Boston, 57 not including those operated on to alleviate pain); Balasubramaniam
et al., Sedative Neurosurgery, 53 J. INDIAN MED. Assoo. 377 (1970) (India, 113);
Chitanondh, Stereotaxic Amygdalotomy in Treatment of Olfactory Seizures and Psychiatric Dis-
orders with Olfactory Hallucinations, 27 CONFIN. NEUROL. 181 (1969) (Thailand); Mark
et al., The Destruction of Both Anterior Thalamic Nuclei in a Patient with Intractable Depres-
sion, 150 J. NERv. MENT. Dis. 266 (1970) (Boston; detailed report of one case whose suicide
following operation made brain dissection possible); Narabayashi et al., Long Range Results
of Stereotaxic Amygdalotomy for Behavior Disorders, 27 CONFIN. NEUROL. 168 (1966)
(Japan, 27); Sano et al., Hypothalamotomy in Treatment of Aggressive Behavior, 27 CONFin.
NEUROL. 164 (1966) (Japan, 22); Cf. Scoville, Recent Thoughts on Psychosurgery, 33 CONN.
MED. 453 (1969) (a Yale professor supports psychosurgery).
60 Breggin, supra note 48, at 5567, and 0. Andy, testifying in Hearings, supra note 49, at
355. Dr. Brown, Director of NIMH, suggests the number might be higher; he states he does
not know "all the clinical practice" taking place. Id. at 343.
61 Breggin, supra note 48, at 5571.
62 Andy, in Hearings, supra note 55, at 351. Andy has performed thalamotomies on "13 or
14" children aged "six and seven through 19." Id. at 353. He describes a boy of nine who
was hyperactive and sadistic and who had to be operated on four times between 1962 and 1965
because he remained hyperactive and sadistic. Now, the patient is "deteriorating" intellectual-
ly. Andy, supra note 59, at 324. In Japan amygdalotomies are performed on children as
young as five who are "uncontrollable, of unsteady mood and of poor concentration."
Narabayashi, supra note 59, at 169, and in Thailand on a nine-year-old with a "strong com-
pulsion to smell engine oil" Chitanondh, supra note 59, at 192.
[Vol. 50: 808]
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Psychosurgeons tend to evaluate the success or failure of their operations,
not in terms of whether it cures the disorder of the patient, but in terms of
whether it makes the patient "quiet and manageable."63 Critics have charged
that the operations are successful in these terms because they "produce ... an
overriding emotional blunting which just happens to eliminate the patient's
problem, among other facets of his or her personality."64 Operations for many
dissimilar disorders aim at the same part of the brain and many different brain
sites have been attacked to cure the same disorder.65 It may well be im-
possible at the present time to perform psychosurgery that does not affect func-
tions and behavior other than the behavior which the surgeon wishes to alter.66
Many psychosurgeons tend to take the analogy between mental and physical
illness too seriously and to assume that the best way of treating any mental dis-
order is to modify the patient's brain.67 The writings of some psychosurgeons sug-
gest that they assume an organic cause for any breach of society's moral codes.6 s
63 Balasubrananiam, supra note 59, at 377, defines "sedative surgery," which he advo-
ates, as that "aspect of neurosurgery where a patient is made quiet and manageable by an
operation," and says that he succeeded in making some patients "very much docile." Id. at
380. Sano notes that his successful patients "became markedly calm, passive and tractable,"
supra note 59, at 167, and Narabayashi, supra note 59, at 169, reports in his study of 27
children that the five best cases now manifest "satisfactory obedience and of constant steady
mood, which enabled the children to stay in their social environment."
64 Letter from two professors at Harvard Medical School in 2 LANCET 434 (1972). A
startling example is the work of Chitanondh in Thailand. Incipient schizophrenics sometimes
manifest their self-hatred by smelling an unpleasant odor on their bodies. See LMNO, supra
note 13, at 120-30. Chitanondli treats this by destroying the part of the brain responsible for
smelling. Chitanondh, supra note 59, at 184-85.
65 Letter, supra note 64. Thus, hyperactive children have been treated by thalamotomy
(Andy) and by amygdalotomy (Narabayashi). Scoville, supra note 59, recommends modified
lobotomies for anxiety, phobias, obsessions and some schizophrenia and admits that: "All
prefrontal lobe surgery benefits from a blunting of function" (emphasis added). In 1974,
Andy published the result of a study which attempted to determine whether he could obtain
different results by picking different parts of the thalamus. Andy, supra note 59.
66 Dr. Brown, Director of NIMH, stated that "even the best research in this field 'is
unable' to pinpoint the exact locus of the undesirable behavior in the brain and destroy only
these tissues and nerve cells leaving other functions and behaviors of the patient unaffected."
Brown, in Hearings, supra note 55, at 344.
67 See text accompanying notes 15-16, supra. Thus, Baasubramaniam, supra note 59,
at 379, describes a model in which stimuli act on the brain which sends out signals causing bad
behavior and implicitly assumes that the best way of treating this is to interrupt the stimuli-
receiving or signal-sending parts of the brain. Mark, supra note 59, discusses the case of a
patient who became severely depressed after her sister committed suicide, her father (to whom
she was passionately devoted) died a lingering death from cancer, and two of her best friends
were hospitalized for serious illness. He treated her by destroying portions of her thalamus; she
remained depressed after each operation. Finally she was released; she immediately killed
herself. These scientists proceed from the truism that all mental disorders involve the brain to
the more debatable conclusion that the best way of treating them is surgical treatment of the
brain. It is true that many psychosurgeons try psychotherapy and chemotherapy first, but
they usually do not give these techniques enough time.
68 See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra. Thus, Andy, in his 1974 article, supra note
59 at 110-11, devised a system for judging the effectiveness of his operations; he assigned a
value from 1 to 4 to various undesirable behavioral traits and computed a score for his patients
before and after operation. A decrease in score would represent an improvement. He assigns
4 points to stealing, forgery and being "wild," 3 points for cursing, 2 points for deceit and for
being "mischievous," "restless," and "euphoric," and 1 point for being "sensitive." Andy later
said it is up to society to decide who should undergo treatment. Andy, in Hearings, supra
note 55, at 352. Scoville, supra note 59, considers lobotomy for "sexual . . . amorality" but
concludes that such surgery would not cure it.
[June 1975]
RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT
The concern that these facts must causees is made greater by the fact that psy-
chosurgery is, by definition, irreversible."
D. Hospitalization and Treatment
None of the treatments discussed above requires lengthy hospitalization; all
can be administered on an outpatient basis. There is good reason to believe
that long-term hospitalization and the institutional setting may be antithera-
peutic. Thus, Congress heard testimony in 1969 and 1970 that "most mental
illness can be treated more effectively... when the positive relationships between
the individual and his family, his job, and his community are not severed."'
If a patient has been institutionalized for several years, "there are certain admin-
istrative procedures and processes which ... act to condition the lives... and
then it becomes very difficult to speak meaningfully of releasing people from these
institutions because they readjust their lives to the routine of the institution."72
The depersonalized care, brutality aside, which mental patients too often receive
at mental hospitals may be antitherapeutic.7 3
E. Commitment Procedures: Theory and Practice
The statutory standards governing involuntary civil commitment vary widely
from state to state.74 All require a "mental illness," which is usually very vaguely
defined. Some states allow commitment only if the individual is dangerous to him-
self or to others. Others (the majority) provide for commitment of nondanger-
ous individuals found to be "in need of care and treatment.17 5 Most states also
have provisions for emergency short-term commitment based on dangerousness."
The procedures for commitment vary also-some states require a hearing before
judge or jury; others permit commitment for an indefinite period following a
69 One Representative said that "'shocking' and 'frightening' are too mild to describe my
reaction.... ." 118 Cong. Rec. 5567 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Gallagher).
70 Dr. Brown, Director of NIMH, makes this point in Hearings, supra note 55, at 347.
71 Dr. S. Kieffer testifying in Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Human Rights
319 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as Human Rights Hearings].
72 A. Cohen, id. at 214. See Wexler, supra note 11, at 118 and sources cited therein. A
later study, with a survey of more recent literature, is Bhaskaran et al., A Comparison of the
Effects of Hospitalization on Long-Stay and Recently Admitted Female Schizophrenic Patients,
20 INT'L J. SOC. PSYCHIAT. 72 (1974).
73 See Rosenhan, supra note 12, at 254-57 and Wexler, supra note 11, at 189-206, for
graphic descriptions of the antitherapeutic aspects of life in a modem mental hospital. Cf.
Human Rights Hearings, supra note 71, at 409 '(psychiatrists often convince the patient that he
is sick). See also Note, Commitment to Fairview: Incompetency to Stand Trial in Pennsylvania,
117 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1164-68 (1969) (antitherapeutic nature of Fairview Hospital). As many
commentators have noted, the annual death rate in mental hospitals, ten percent, is over ten
times the national rate. N. KrrTRI, THE RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT 96 (1971). This may be
partly explained by the older average age of the mental hospital population.
74 Several recent publications discuss the statutes in detail, including AMERIcAN BAR
FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (rev. ed. S. Brackel & R. Rock 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Brackel & Rock]; ACLU, HANDBOOK: THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS
(B. Ennis & L. Siegel ed. 1973); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally I1, 87 HAnv. L.
Rzv. 1190 '(1974).
75 At present, 15 states require a finding of dangerousness to self or others; the rest allow
commitment of those in need of care or treatment (29) or when necessary to protect the wel-




hearing by an administrative board or following certification by one or more
physicians.
Empirical studies of how the commitment process works in practice 8 tend
to suggest that these statutory differences in standards and procedure may not be
as significant as they appear. Although one study was done in Arizona which
has a statutory standard of dangerousness and requires a hearing before a judge
with four witnesses, and another was done in Iowa which has a "care or treat-
ment" standard and which provides for hearings before a board composed of a
court clerk, a physician, and an attorney, both studies reached similar conclusions
about how the systems work in practice.
Every commitment proceeding must be initiated by someone, usually a rela-
tive or acquaintance. In both Arizona and Iowa, this was often done for im-
proper motives-because of the eccentric life-style of the respondent or out of
malice." Neither state had an effective mechanism for screening out these
defective petitions before hearing, so that the respondents were detained for
psychiatric examination and hearing."0
The hearings themselves were often amazingly short-under five minutes.8 '
The patient-if present at all 2-- may have been forcibly given tranquilizers
before the hearing. 3 At the hearings, the judge or commissioners tend to follow
the recommendations of the state examining psychiatrist virtually 100 percent of
the time." Often, the examination on which the diagnosis is based is almost as
short and perfunctory as the hearing itself"8 and the psychiatrist's conclusion
gleaned from his mere reading of the petition.8 His testimony is often limited to
conclusory diagnostic labels and even legal conclusions, such as that the patient
77 See Brakel & Rock, supra note 74, at 49-61.
78 See e.g., B. RocK, S. JACOBSON, & T. JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND DIscHARGE OF
THE MENTALLY ILL 121-211 (1968); (Los Angeles, Chicago, Kansas, Pennsylvania); ScHEFF,
supra note 7, at 130-55 (unnamed Midwestern state); Adelman & Chambers, Effective Coun-
sel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Mtss. L.J.
43, 54-64 (1974) (Memphis, Chicago--empirical work is mostly on failure of appointed coun-
sel); Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally I1, 44 Tx.
L. REv. 424, 427-31 (1966) (Texas) [hereinafter cited as Cohen]; Wexler, supra note 11
(Arizona); Project, Facts and Fallacies About Iowa Civil Commitment, 55 IowA L. Rav.
895 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Iowa].
Comparable studies on commitment through the criminal process are Broderick, Justice in
the Books or Justice in Action-An Institutional Approach to Involuntary Hospitalization for
Mental Illness, 20 CATE. U. L. REv. 547 (1971); Granucci & Granucci, Indiana's Sexual Psy-
chopath Act in Operation, 44 IND. L.J. 555 (1969).
Support for my arguments is provided by all of these. I have also profited from a tele-
phone interview with R. Gottlieb, deputy director of Mental Health Information Service, New
York City. A few jurisdictions, e.g., New York (see note 316 infra), have more enlightened
procedures than those described here.
79 Wexler at 18-23; Iowa at 904.
80 Wexler at 16-18; Iowa at 905-06.
81 Wexler at 38 (hearings in Maricopa County, where half of Arizona's population lives,
average 4.7 minutes); SCHEFF, supra note 7, at 133 (1.6 minutes); Cohen at 430 (2 minutes);
Iowa at 916 (15 to 30 minutes--but based on commission's estimates, not observation).
82 Patients in Iowa are present only 60 percent of the time (Iowa at 916) and are not
always present in Arizona (Wexler at 39). See also Cohen at 429.
83 Wexler at 66-69; see also Note, supra note 74, at 1282 n.111.
84 97.9 percent in Maricopa County, Arizona (Wexler at 60); similarly SCHEFF, supra
note 7, at 138-39, Iowa at 924, 936, 940.
85 Scxa.FF, supra note 7, at 144-45 (10.2 minutes); Iowa at 912-13 (under 20 minutes,
usually done by a physician not a psychiatrist); see also N. KiTriu_, TrE RIGHT TO BE Dti-
PERENT 92 n.170 (1971).
86 Wexler at 61.
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"suffers from a major psychiatric illness and would be dangerous to others.""7
The facts which led to this conclusion are often not brought out at all.
The patient's attorney almost never cross-examines the psychiatrist to lay
bare the factual basis of the diagnosis or counterpose medical experts of his own."8
As the commentators observe, lawyers are not afraid to cross-examine doctors and
psychiatrists when they are fighting a personal injury action or contesting a will."9
Their far more passive attitude in an area where a person's liberty is at stake may
be explained by the tendency of lawyers to believe that the interests of their clients
are best served if treatment is received; the fact that public defenders in commit-
ment hearings are compensated by the case and not by the hour; and the fact
that the lawyer may have met his client for only 15 minutes before the hearing, if
that.
0
Another phenomenon recognized in the empirical studies is a tendency on
the part of psychiatrists, judges, and commissioners consciously to ignore the
statutory standards for commitment. Both doctors and judges in Arizona in-
dicated that they would be willing to declare a person dangerous if they thought
that treatment or custodial care would be good for him.9 In Iowa, this attitude
leads the commissioners to commit people who are only questionably mentally ill,
as they do not wish to deny treatment where it may be needed and they wrongly
believe that the hospital will release anyone they erroneously send to it.9 2
It would seem apparent that the end result of the commitment process is to
put into the hospitals many people who do not belong there. This was the con-
clusion reached by those studies in which the judgment of independent observers
was contrasted with the judgment of the commission or judge. Thus, the Arizona
study found that one-quarter of the patients committed in the hearings observed
were dangerous only in the sense of socially offensive, and concluded that "many
individuals are committed who are really not dangerous by any common sense
definition of the term."93 Other studies reach similar conclusions.94
III. Constitutional Protection of Autonomy
A. Historical Overview
There are several provisions of the Constitution from which a right to refuse
87 Wexler at 40-41, 64-65; Cohen at 429.
88 Wexler at 51-54; Cohen at 429.
89 Wexler at 52.
90 Wexler at 53-55; Iowa at 914, 921-22; Cohen at 446-50. The role of counsel is similarly
discussed in Blinick, supra note 7, at 111-15 and in Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Com-
mitment Proceedings: Emerging Problems, 62 CALar. L. REv. 816 (1974).
91 Wexler at 61, 100-01, 111, 117.
92 Iowa at 924, 939. The bending of statutory standards was also noted by Granucci,
supra note 78, at 593-94 and stressed by Gottlieb, supra note 78.
93 Wexier at 110-11.
94 Scheff found that 63 percent were neither clearly dangerous nor severely mentally im-
paired, supra note 7, at 132. The Iowa study said that the commissioners themselves estimate
that 52 percent of those that appear before them are capable of making a choice as to their
need for treatment and only 29 percent are dangerous; yet over 90 percent are committed.
Iowa at 918. The conclusion that many inmates do not belong in hospitals was supported by
Gottlieb, supra note 78.
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treatment might flow; among those suggested by cases"s and commentators s are
the first, fourth, and eighth amendments to the Constitution, the emerging right of
privacy, and the due process clause. Our understanding of what protection the
Constitution offers, however, is not furthered by an amendment-by-amend-
ment analysis of the cases. Rather, it is more fruitful to view many of the cases
decided under disparate amendments as forming two lines of cases, both of
which carve out areas of individual autonomy. The first of these lines protects
self-determination; the second, bodily integrity.
Self-determination may be defined97 as the freedom of the individual to
choose his own values and goals and to shape his life in conformity with these
95 See text accompanying notes 236-73 infra.
96 The literature in this area is extensive. Some of the more relevant articles are:
A. Articles on the right to refuse treatment. Bowers, Prisoners' Rights in Prison Medical
Experimentation Programs, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 319 (1972), Kassirer, Behavior Modifica-
tion for Patients and Prisoners: Constitutional Ramifications of Enforced Therapy, 2 J.
PsYcHiAT. & LAW 245 (1974); J. Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal
Fiction, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 755 (1969); Moya & Achtenberg, Behavior Modification: Legal
Limitations on Methods and Goals, 50 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 230 (1974); Shapiro, Legislating
the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47
S. CALIF. L. Rav. 237 (1974); Note, Compulsory Commitment: The Rights of the Incarcer-
ated Mentally II, 1969 Duxn L.J. 677, 711-15; Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies
Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CALIF.
L. REV. 616 (1972).
B. Articles critical of present involuntary civil commitment: the standards and the pro-
cedures. Chayet, Legal Neglect of the Mentally Ill, 125 Am. J. PsYcHi&T. 785 (1968); N.
KrrrsaE, TE IuHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the
Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75 (1968); Note, Civil Commitment
of the Mentally Ill, 30 U. PiTT. L. Rav. 752 (1969); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classi-
fication, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974); Postel, Civil Commitment: A Functional Analysis, 38
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1971); Siegel, Justifications for Medical Commitment-Real or Illusory,
6 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 21 (1969); Taylor, Critical Look into the Involuntary Civil Commit-
ment Procedure, 10 WASHBURN L.J. 237 (1971). On particular state statutes: Note, Califor-
ni's New Mental Commitment Legislation: Is It Legally Sufficient?, 6 CALIF. WEST. L. REv.
146 '(1969); Note, Civil Commitment Procedure in Louisiana, 31 LA. L. Rav. 149 (1970);
Note, Mental Illness and Due Process: Involuntary Commitment in New York, 16 N.Y.L.F.
165 (1970).
See also Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally II, 79 HAav. L. R.v. 1288 (1966);
Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HA:.v. L. REv. 1190 (1974); Symposium,
Mental Disability and the Law, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 671 (1974).
C. Articles on relevant constitutional issues. Comment, The Constitutional Right of
Privacy: An Examination, Nw. U.L. Rav. 263 (1974); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YA.LE L.J. 920 (1973); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974) ; Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty,
48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670 (1973); Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA.
L. REV. 1048 (1962); Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by the People?"
37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 787 (1962); Singer, Privacy, Autonomy and Dignity in the Prison: A
Preliminary Inquiry Concerning Constitutional Aspects of the Degradation Process in Our
Prisons, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 669 (1972); Tribe, Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process
of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973).
97 When I define "self-determination," I do not mean to imply that everything falling
under this broad definition is necessarily protected by the Constitution, any more than a
definition of "speech" entails that everything so defined is protected by freedom of speech.
Nor do I want to suggest that even this broad description of what state actions infringe self-
determination would necessarily include regulations designed to help the individual implement
his goals and values by correcting for the individual's poor risk evaluation (laws requiring
motorcyclists to wear crash helmets) or insufficient knowledge (consumer protection laws) or
by restraining the individual from acting on a very short term impulse that would destroy his
prospects of fulfilling his goals in the future (erecting high fences on Golden Gate Bridge) or
by correcting a situation of duress which superficially looks like freedom of choice (minimum
wage laws).
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values. From this concept it follows that a state action infringes on self-determi-
nation when:
(1) It makes it harder for a specific individual to choose or act on a
specific value; or
(2) it makes it harder for a specific individual to choose or act on any
values at all; or
(3) it attempts to impose the values of one group upon another group.
The development of this idea antedates the Constitution. It finds expression
in many leading Supreme Court cases. The Court, in forbidding West Virginia
from requiring Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the flag, in State Board of Education
v. Barnete," reasoned that such salutes "require affirmation of a belief and an
attitude of mind"99 and stated that-
[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, na-
tionalism, religion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit
an exception, they do not now occur to us. 00
Many other cases express support for self-determination in this sense;'- such
judges as Brandeis, Holmes, and Frankfurter have espoused it.'
0 '
There has developed alongside this tradition of self-determination, another
strand of autonomy, an individual's "interest in the integrity of his person.' 0 3
The core concept of bodily integrity is that there should be no nonconsensual
touching of an individual's body. The roots of this concept may antedate the
98 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
99 Id. at 633.
100 Id. at 642 (Black & Douglas, J. J., concurring). Jackson's opinion was joined by four
Justices, one of whom wrote a separate opinion also, and "substantially" joined by two more
in a separate opinion. The latter opinion contains language similar to that quoted in text.
See id. at 644 (Murphy, J., concurring).
101 See e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) ("outside areas of plainly harmful
conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best," quoting Chafee);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-62 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 '(1972);
and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969), all discussed at text accompanying notes
132, 195-204 infra. See also Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58, 62 (W.D.N.C. 1969),
where the Court, in striking down a state vagrancy statute, said:
In the United States belief and noninjurious behavior are not punishable. A man
is free to be -a hippie, a Methodist, a Jew, a Black Panther, a Kiwanian, or even a
Communist, so long as his conduct does not imperil others, or infringe upon their
rights. In short, it is no crime to be a hippie.
Cf. Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
102 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, J.J., concur-
ring): "Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make
men free to develop their faculties"; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring, discussing Holmes' belief in "the right to search for truth"). Cf. Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905), where Justice Harlan, before finding that the state
had a compelling interest in requiring smallpox vaccination to prevent epidemics, stated:
There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the supremacy
of his own will and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government,
especially of any free government existing under a written constitution, to interfere
with the exercise of that will.
103 W. PROSSER, TORTS 34 (4th ed. 1971).
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evolution of man. 4 It is the foundation of the torts of battery 0 5 and assaulte
and the doctrine of informed consent. 07
Protection of personal integrity has expanded from the core concept to
cover intrusions which do not literally touch, such as photographs or wiretaps, and
intrusions into the home. Such integrity is recognized in the colonial documents
which were the first to advocate a right to be free of unreasonable searches. The
first of these, drafted by Samuel Adams in 1772, complains that "our houses and
even our bed chambers, are exposed to be ransacked" and that British officers
may "under colour of law... break thro' the sacred rights of the Domicil. .. ""'
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford" appears to be the first Supreme Court
case to recognize the "inviolability of the person.""' Justice Gray applied this
"right to one's person"r "' to forbid a district court to order a surgical examina-
tion for the plaintiff in a tort case." 2 This decision was based on common law,
but the Court has not hesitated to apply various provisions of the Constitution,
especially the fourth amendment, to protect personal integrity. In fact, the Court
has stated that "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State."""'
Many other fourth amendment cases also refer to personal integrity."
4
Nor do all the cases granting constitutional protection to integrity rely on
the fourth amendment. Rochlin v. California"5 relies upon due process to forbid
policemen to pump the stomach of a suspected narcotics dealer seen to swallow
two capsules; Justice Frankfurter spoke in terms of "illegally breaking into the
privacy of the petitioner" and used the memorable phrase "conduct that shocks
the conscience""' 6 to describe this violation of Rochin's bodily integrity. Other
cases have used the eighth amendment" 7 or have suggested the use of the right
of privacy". to uphold personal integrity.
It is one thing to show that the courts often speak approvingly of autonomy
and sometimes grant protection to it and another to show that many of the
court decisions on the first, fourth, eighth and fourteenth amendments are better
104 R. ARD EY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE (1966).
105 PROSSER at 34-35, 261 (liability beyond risk for impact on the person).
106 PROSSER at 37-38.
107 See text accompanying notes 274-78 infra.
108 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 206 (1971).
109 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
110 Id. at 252.
111 Id. at 251.
112 The Court later allowed compulsory examinations of plaintiffs, in Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), but said this did not interfere with "freedom from invasion of
the person," id. at 14, apparently because he gives implied consent by bringing the action.
113 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 27 (1949): "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which
is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society," and Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also text accompanying notes
170-71 infra.
114 See e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656
(1961); Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 374 (9th Cir. 1968); York v. Story, 324
F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963). The last two are discussed at text accompanying notes 217-21
int ra.
115 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
116 Id. at 172.
117 See text accompanying notes 161-68 infra.
118 Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
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viewed as based on a constitutional protection of autonomy than as based on
those specific amendments. Proof of the latter requires a closer analysis.
The Bill of Rights makes no mention on its face of self-determination, nor,
except narrowly," 9 of personal integrity. In its language, it is "a series of isolated
points,"220 of specific things which the state may not do. It would have
been quite logical for the courts to have construed the Bill of Rights quite
narrowly; in other words not only to limit the rights given constitutional pro-
tection to those expressly mentioned in the first eight amendments' 2' but to have
interpreted these specific guarantees in the light of the plain meaning of the words
and of their accepted meaning in 1791. Of course, the courts have not done so.
If one adopts an amendment-by-amendment analysis, the way in which the
specific provisions have evolved may seem arbitrary and even illegitimate. If,
instead, one views the whole range of cases as a process in which the Supreme
Court extends the scope allowed individual autonomy and protects self-determi-
nation and bodily integrity, then the "whole pageant of Anglo-American consti-
tutional development"' 2 2 takes on new meaning.
If we adopt this methodology, we are faced with two questions. First, what
strategies or techniques do the courts use to extend the specific guarantees of the
first eight amendments to cover broader areas of autonomy? Second, since to
view the cases as a process of developing protection for individual autonomy does
not imply that the protection afforded autonomy is absolute or even that all
actions involving autonomy are given some protection, which areas of autonomy
are given protection and how strong must a conflicting interest be in order to
override this protection?
Asking what strategy the court used in a case instead of what amendment
decision was based on has heuristic advantages. If concepts such as substantive
due process and the ninth amendment are each viewed as one of many techniques
used to advance a trend deeply rooted in tradition, then some of the illegitimacy
and novelty associated with their use will disappear, and the controversies con-
cerning them"2 will be clarified; the issue will be whether due process or the
ninth amendment is an effective and desirable means of granting protection to a
given area of autonomy.
There are several strategies which the courts have used. First is the principle
of effectiveness: A provision is interpreted broadly in order to make the right
effective or to achieve the purpose of the provision. Courts are not compelled
to do this; penal statutes are generally not broadly construed to make them more
effective. 12 However, the Supreme Court normally has done so when self-deter-
mination or personal integrity is involved 25 In holding that a state court could
119 The fourth amendment, of course, mentions the "right to be secure in their persons"
but only in the context of searches by law officers.
120 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
121 Black, of course, believed this. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting).
122 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 108, at v.
123 On the ninth amendment see Redlich, supra note 96.
124 See United States v. Farber, 306 F. Supp. 48, 53 (N.D. Cal. 1969), and the many cases
cited therein.
125 The Supreme Court stated this philosophy of broad construction very early on in Boyd
v. United States, 115 U.S. 616, 635 (1885): "illegitimate ... practices get their first footing
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not require the N.A.A.C.P. to produce its membership lists Justice Harlan ob-
served that "[i]nviolability of privacy in group association may . . . be indis-
pensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group
espouses dissident beliefs." '126 The Court in Mapp v. Ohio,"2 extending the
exclusionary rule to state trials, stated that "[t]o hold otherwise is to grant the
right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment."'1
2
Secondly, there is the principle that due process of law is a "summarized
constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities which... are
'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental.""' While this theory has been used to restrict the application of pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights to the states, 3 ' it has also been employed to expand
these provisions to give more protection to autonomy"' and even to cover areas
of autonomy not falling under the eight amendments. It was used to create a
right to travel in Kent v. Dulles' 2 and the right to marry the person of one's
choice in Loving v. Virginia."' It was cited in three of the opinions in Griswold
v. Connecticut"4 as authority for protecting the "right of marital privacy."' 35 The
Court in Roe v. Wade"6 used it "to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy.""
7
Thirdly, the ninth amendment shows that there are protected rights not
enumerated in the first eight amendments. Although recommended by several
commentators,"' this strategy has not been given much support by the courts."9
Fourthly, and finally, the major strategy which the Supreme Court has used
to broaden constitutional coverage of individual autonomy is the expansion of
the definitions of the words used in the first eight amendments to embrace new
areas of autonomy. Referring to the eighth amendment in Trop v. Dulles,'
Chief Justice Warren stated "the words of the Amendment are not precise, and
... their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."''
... by . .. slight deviations.... This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that con-
stitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed."
126 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). Similar statements are found in Bates
v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960).
127 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
128 Id. at 656.
129 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952), quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) and Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947). Black argued against this view, id. at 69-123.
130 This restrictive use is declining. Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968).
131 As in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
27 (1949). See also Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961).
132 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958). The right to travel has also been based on other grounds.
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969), and cases cited there.
133 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
134 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
135 Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
136 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
137 Id. at 153. See also id. at 167-68 (Stewart, J., concurring).
138 See e.g., Redlich, supra note 96.
139 Three of the judges in Griswold use it to bolster their due process arguments. 381 U.S.
at 488-93 (1965). Mapp v. Ohio speaks of "[tihe right to privacy, no less important than any
other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people." 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
140 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
141 Id. at 100-01.
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This philosophy has been used pervasively to change the Bill of Rights from "a
series of isolated points" to "a rational continuum which... includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints." '142 This
strategy has been used in many areas.
1. Religion
Colonial documents that guarantee freedom of religion use a concept of reli-
gion that embodies the worship of God. The first document to protect freedom
of religion, the Maryland Toleration Act of 1649, stated that it dealt with "mat-
ters concerning Religion and the honor of God"'" and granted freedom only to
those "professmig to believe in Jesus Christ."'" The 1772 Rights of the Colonists
advocated freedom of religion because of its concern with "various attempts,
which have been made and are now making, to establish an American Episco-
pate."'45 Recent cases have expanded the concept of religion to comprise, not
only the worship of a divinity, but also some, if not all, deeply held moral con-
victions. In United States v. Seeger," the Court interpreted the provision of the
Universal Military Training and Service Act granting exemption from conscrip-
tion to those who "by reason of religious training and belief," defined as "belief
in relation to a Supreme Being," are "conscientiously opposed to participation
in war in any form."" 7 Seeger claimed a "devotion to goodness and virtue for
their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed.""'  The Court
construed the statute to apply to any "sincere and meaningful belief which oc-
cupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those
admittedly qualifying for the exemption.""' 9 While this holding rests on statutory
interpretation, the interpretation is quite strained, 5 ' and the Court stated that
to hold otherwise would "classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and
excluding others."' 5 '
Later cases in this area also protect self-determination and respect the indi-
vidual's intense moral values by including such convictions within the concept of
religion. Thus, in Welsh v. United States,"'52 an applicant who "held deep con-
scientious scruples against taking part in wars,"'5 3 which were formed through
his study of sociology and history,' 5 ' was held to qualify for exemption, and the
statutory definition of religion was said to include the case of "an individual
[who] deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in
142 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
143 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 108, at 91 (emphasis added).
144 Id. at 93.
145 Id. at 210. The Senate eliminated the words "nor shall the rights of conscience be in-
fringed" from the first amendment. Id. at 1146.
146 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
147 62 Stat. 604, 613 (1948).
148 380 U.S. at 166.
149 Id. at 176.
150 Harlan called it an "Alice-in-Wonderland" interpretation, concurring, in Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 345-54 (1970).
151 380 U.S. at 176.
152 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
153 Id. at 337.
154 Id. at 341.
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source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of con-
science." ' s
2. Punishment
Just as the scope of the word "religion" has been broadened to protect self-
determination, so the meaning of the word "punishment" has expanded to pro-
tect personal integrity. When Colonial writers talked of inhumane punishments,
what they had in mind were retributive sanctions imposed by the criminal pro-
cess. The first document to ban barbarous punishments, the 1641 Massachusetts
Body of Liberties, placed the prohibition of "bodilie punishments ... that are
inhumane Barbarous or cruel" in the section dealing with criminal justice; the
one provision concerning specific punishments stated that "No man shall be
beaten with above 40 stripes, nor shall any true gentleman... be punished with
a whipping, unless his crime be very shamefull, and his course of life vitious and
profligate."1  Recent decisions, however, break down the distinctions between
retribution and treatment, between criminal conviction and civil commitment.
Inmates of Boys' Training School v. ABleck157 dealt with a challenge to condi-
tions, especially isolation for disciplinary reasons at a reformatory many of whose
inmates had not violated the criminal law and were confined according to a
statute providing for "custody, care and discipline" to achieve "instruction and
reformation," not punishment. "' It was held that the fact that the isolation was
allegedly "for rehabilitative purposes, does not preclude operation of the Eighth
Amendment."' 9
The courts' scrutiny has been extended to the conditions of nonretributive
confinement in a similar fashion in other cases."
155 Id. at 340. Judge Wyzanski, in United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass.
1969), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 399 U.S. 267 (1970), held the Universal
Military Training Act unconstitutional as applied to an applicant whose principles would not
allow him to fight in the Vietnam war. In holding Sisson's views covered by freedom of reli-
gion, the court said:
Duty once commonly appeared as the "stem daughter of the voice of God." Today
to many she appears as the stem daughter of the voice of conscience. It is not
the ancestry but the authenticity of the sense of duty which creates constitutional
legitimacy.
Id. at 909.
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), which refused to extend conscientious
objector status to an applicant who thought the Vietnam war unjust, did not hold that such a
belief was not religious, for the Court stated that "however 'political and particular' the judg-
ment underlying objection to a particular war, the objection still might be rooted in religion
and conscience." Id. at 458. Rather, it rested its decision on the fact that there were "neutral
and secular" reasons for limiting the exemption, so the limitation did not "reflect a religious
preference," id. at 454, and on the "substantial governmental interest," id. at 462, in over-
riding these religious beliefs. This overriding interest has been the traditional reason for deny-
ing constitutional status to religious objections to conscription. See United States v. Macintosh,
283 U.S. 605, 623-25 (1931).
156 SCiwARTZ, supra note 108, at 76-77.
157 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D. R.I. 1972).
158 Id. at 1363.
159 Id. at 1366.
160 Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1973); Lollis v. New York Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). In Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972), the court said, "We have
no doubt that well-intentioned attempts to rehabilitate a child could, in extreme circumstances,
constitute cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 1240.
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3. Cruel and unusual
The definition of "cruel and unusual" has also changed to give protection
to individual autonomy."' The Massachusetts document mentioned earlie' 2 ex-
pressly permitted whippings and, under certain circumstances, torture.' A
member of the congressional committee debating the Bill of Rights observed that
"villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off."'164 Such
atrocities are forbidden today. The clause has evolved to prohibit those punish-
ments which grossly violate bodily integrity, such as whipping, 6 " or deprive one
of his status as an individual whose right to have values and make choices is
respected. This is why the Court has declared denationalization a cruel and un-
usual punishment,'6" why bodily pain is not the sole test of cruelty,"6 7 and why
some opinions state that "a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading
to the dignity of human beings.' 68
4. Searches
When the Framers sought to protect personal integrity with the fourth
amendment, they were concerned more with the "insolence" of British officers
who would "enter our houses, search, insult, and seize at pleasure'6 9 than with
intrusion by stealth or eavesdropping. Of course, they could not envisage the
development of devices for long-distance communication and of devices for
intercepting that communication. In 1927, the Supreme Court refused to extend
the meaning of "searches" to encompass wiretapping; one cannot, said Chief
Justice Taft, "justify enlargement of the language employed beyond the possible
practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words
search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight."'1" Brandeis, in a famous dis-
sent, observed that the courts had already extended the concept of "search" to
reach cases that "[n]o court which looked at the words of the Amendment rather
than at its underlying purpose would hold" fall within its scope.' And in Katz
v. United States,"2 the Supreme Court "departed from the narrow view on which
[Taft's] decision rested." FBI agents had attached a microphone to the outside
of a public telephone booth and listened to Katz's conversations on that tele-
Cf. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 645 (E.D. Va. 1971); Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d
1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
161 See text accompanying note 141 supra; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373
(1910).
162 See text accompanying note 156 supra.
163 SCWxvARTZ, supra note 108, at 76-77.
164 Id. at 1053.
165 In Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968), the court declared that the
use of the strap in Arkansas jails, "irrespective of any precautionary conditions which may be
imposed, offends contemporary concepts of decency and human dignity."
166 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Cf. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967),
holding Congress has no power to denationalize.
167 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910).
168 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271 (Brennan, J., concurring).
169 ScawAnTz, supra note 108, at 488-89.
170 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
171 Id. at 476.
172 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
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phone.' In refusing to allow this evidence to be admitted, the Court affirmed
the concept of bodily integrity in two ways. First, the concept of "search" was
extended beyond physical intrusion 7 . to cover the intrusion of "the uninvited
ear. "75 Second, the Court emphasized that the primary value protected was
personal integrity, not integrity of the home; "the Fourth Amendment," they
said, "protects people, not places."' 6 Following this logic, the Court has also
held that a compulsory blood test intrudes upon the sphere of personal integrity
and is thus a "search" within the fourth amendment. 7
5. Speech
Justice Brennan, in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,' noted that the courts do not
use "a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly."' 79
In that case, freedom of speech was used to forbid Virginia to use its power of
punishing malpractice by attorneys in order to prevent the N.A.A.C.P. from
financing plaintiffs in civil rights actions; "litigation" said the Court, is "a form
of political expression."'3" Freedom of speech has also been held to protect
peaceful, silent sit-ins in segregated facilities.' Nor has the reach of the first
amendment been restricted to political speech, as it would have been if freedom
of speech were based, not on self-determination, but on its relation to democratic
government 8 2 Thus, "portrayal of sex" (though not obscenity) receives pro-
tection as "one of the vital problems of human interest."'
6. Privacy
The Court, in Roe v. Wade,' stated that a long line of decisions recognize
that a "right of privacy does exist under the Constitution."' 8 Talk of a right
of privacy may be confusing, however, since this phrase has been used to refer
to several disparate issues since it was coined in 1890."6 Warren and Brandeis
employed the term in the sense of a right to prevent one's private life or writings
173 Id. at 348.
174 Id. at 353.
175 Id. at 352. Harlan's concurrence also speaks of "freedom from intrusion." Id. at 361.
176 Id. at 351. These holdings are not weakened by the more recent decision in United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). White's confederate was a government informer who
carried a concealed transmitter allowing government agents to hear conversations between the
two. The Court said this was no different from a case in which a police informant testified
against his confederate in court and in effect held this was no infringement because White had
chosen to talk to the informant. Katz thus represents the borderline of protection today; White
did not push this border back.
177 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966), although the Court held that the
search in that case was reasonable.
178 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
179 Id. at 430. He further said, "A State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional
rights by mere labels." Id. at 429.
180 Id.
181 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966), and cases cited therein at 133.
182 Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-35
(1971).
183 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (italics added).
184 410 U.S. 113 '(1973).
185 Id. at 152.
186 Warren & Brandeis. The Right to Privacy, 4 H~av. L. Rv. 193 (1890).
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from being made public. The right of privacy may also refer to the right of
bodily integrity, 87 and many cases have used it in this fashion,"' including many
of those cited in Roe. Roe and Griswold put the established concept of a right
to privacy to an entirely new use-that of protecting areas of self-determination.
The dissenting Justices were quick to note this redefinition."8 9
B. Constitutional Protection of Autonomy Today
This article has discussed how the courts use a variety of strategies to protect
personal autonomy. This does not imply that the courts will (or should) extend
constitutional protection to all areas of autonomy; nor does it mean that auton-
omy, once protection is granted, cannot be overridden by a strong conflicting
interest. The article has described the process of expansion of autonomy; it
remains to delineate autonomy's present borders, and show to what regions the
protection extends and how strong the protection is. 9°
Any infringement of freedom of choice which is wholly arbitrary, capricious,
and irrational will be held unconstitutional. 9' But in many areas, all that the
courts require to sustain an infringement is that the law have "a reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose."' 92 In such a case "every possible pre-
sumption is in favor of its validity"' 93 and the court will not closely investigate
whether the judgment by the legislature that the regulation is a reasonable means
of implementing their purpose is borne out by the facts. 94 At other times, the
court will demand more; it will require a compelling, not just a proper, legis-
lative purpose, and will be quicker to declare that the purpose is improper or
that the law is an unreasonable means of reaching it. Although there are no
formulae to predict with mathematical precision the measure of protection to
be given in every instance, some rough indications may be gleaned from the
cases. The courts are likely to demand more than a mere "reasonable relation"
to override self-determination or bodily integrity when one or more of the fol-
lowing criteria are met:
1. The state action encroaches on the core of bodily integrity-that is,
a nonconsensual touching of the body. The courts may also scrutinize an
intrusion on personal integrity that does not involve touching although they
are less likely to.
2. The state action imposes the values of one group of people upon
another group.
187 Id. at 205. This right of privacy is distinct from intrusion on the body.
188 See text accompanying notes 109-18 supra.
189 381 U.S. 479, 508-10 (1965) (Griswold); 410 U.S. 113, 172 (1973) (Roe). It may
be noted that when the Court in Katz said there is no general constitutional right to privacy,
they were using the term in a Warren-Brandeis sense.
190 Recent cases in this area have received extensive discussion. See Comment, The Con-
stitutional Right of Privacy: An Examination, 69 Nw. U.L. Rav. 263 (1974); Note, On
Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 670 (1974).
191 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934); see United States v. Carolene Products,
304 U.S. 144, 152 '(1938).
192 304 U.S. at 152 (Carolene); 291 U.S. at 537 (Nebbia); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
193 291 U.S. at 538 (Nebbia).
194 304 U.S. at 152 (Carolene).
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3. The state action makes it impossible, or so costly as in practice to
be impossible, for a specific individual legally to hold or act on a specific
value or live a specific way of life.
4. The state action makes it harder for a specific individual to hold
any values or goals at all, or to act on any values or goals at all.
In some recent cases, the laws declared unconstitutional met several of these
criteria. The abortion statutes struck down by the Supreme Court fit within the
second criterion because they imposed the values of some religious groups (as
to when life begins) upon everyone,195 just as a law forbidding the teaching of
Darwin's theories is void because it imposed the doctrines of some religious
sects upon nonbelievers.' The laws in Roe also meet the third criterion because
they made it impossible for some pregnant women to remain childless 9 And,
as the Court noted, a prohibition of abortion approaches the fourth criterion
because the responsibilities of motherhood foreclose many ways of life for the
woman and "may force upon the woman a distressful life and future." '98
The anticontraception statutes reviewed in Griswold and Eisenstadt meet
these criteria in a fashion similar to the antiabortion laws. The statutes in these
two cases had the goal of "limit[ing] contraception in and of itself" 9 and made
it impossible for the parties involved legally to procure contraceptives."9 ' The
Court thus found these laws "unwarranted governmental intrusion [upon] the
decision whether to bear or beget a child." ''
Another case which involved several of the criteria is Stanley v. Georgia."2
There, state police acting under a search warrant found obscene films in Stanley's
bedroom; he was convicted under Georgia's obscenity statutes. The statutes as
applied, the Court found, imposed the state's moral code upon unwilling indi-
viduals (second criterion) :
[A] state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men's minds .... Georgia asserts the right to protect the individual's mind
from the effects of obscenity. We are not certain that this argument amounts
to anything more than the assertion that the state has the right to control
the moral content of a person's thoughts. To some, this may be a noble
purpose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amend-
ment.
203
195 This point is made by (Professor) Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term-Foreword:
Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 IARv. L. Rv. 1, 18-25
(1973). The Court makes it in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-62 (1973).
196 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
197 The Georgia statute in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 182-84 (1973), did not forbid
all abortions, but presumably one reason that the Court scrutinized the requirements of hospital
accreditation, id. at 194, and hospital committees, id. at 198, so carefully is that some women
might find it impossible to get the necessary approval from the abortion committees of
accredited hospitals.
198 410 U.S. at 153.
199 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
200 Although they could have lied and said they needed them to prevent disease. Id. at 442.
201 Id. at 453.
202 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
203 Id. at 565-66.
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The third criterion was also met, since by banning pornography everywhere,
including in the individual's own home, the statute made it impossible for an
individual legally to act on a scheme of values which affirmed pornography.
Furthermore, although there was no touching of Stanley's body, personal integ-
rity was also involved in Stanley, since police had ransacked Stanley's bedroom
and seized the films acting under a warrant allowing a search for book-making
records; three justices made this the basis of their concurrence.0 4
Recent cases have refused to extend the protection of Stanley to public
theatres,205 to transportation of films in interstate commerce, 00 or even to the
importation of obscene matter for private use.2"' These decisions may seem
wrong, and the future development of protection for personal autonomy may
sweep them aside. Nevertheless, they may be distinguished from Stanley on the
basis of the four principles. Unlike Stanley, these cases do not involve an intrusion
upon the privacy of the home, as the Court was quick to point out. s Moreover,
for that reason, they do not make it impossible for a person to pursue values
which sanction obscenity, although it may be argued that to forbid the transport
of films to one's home comes close to doing this. Because the regulations did not
invade the home, the Court did not consider them as much an effort to "control
the minds or thoughts of" or impose the state's values upon dissenting indi-
viduals, but, rather, a regulation of conduct in public places. 0" Thus, the obscenity
statutes upheld by the courts did not violate the first three criteria, as did the
Stanley statute; and neither law violated the fourth criterion.
The third criterion does not apply to state actions which make acting on a
specific value inconvenient, but only to those actions which make such action
virtually impossible for a specific individual. This fact explains an apparent in-
consistency between two recent cases. An act of Congress denying food stamps to
any household containing an individual unrelated to any other member of the
household was struck down in US. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.2- it
was held that a desire to hurt "hippie" communes "cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest."2 1' But a zoning regulation permitting houses in the
village of Belle Terre to be occupied only by single families, or by two unrelated
people, was upheld in Village of Belle Terre v. Bora4w2. applying the rational
relationship test used for ordinary economic and social legislation. There was an
element of imposed morality present in Moreno and not in Boraas because the
Belle Terre ordinance exempted unmarried couples from its reach, and this dis-
tinction was important to the Boraas court.21 Equally important was the fact
204 Id. at 569-72. All nine Justices held Georgia's action unconstitutional.
205 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
206 United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
207 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
208 See 413 U.S. at 65-66; 413 U.S. at 142; 413 U.S. at 126.
209 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973). The public-private distinc-
tion is also being implemented in other areas of sexual conduct as is noted in Comment, supra
note 190, at 266-68. See also Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forihdding Private Homo-
sexual Conduct, 72 MicH. L. Rnv. 1613 (1974).
210 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
211 Id. at 534.
212 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
213 Id. at 8.
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that denying food stamps might make it very burdensome indeed for poor, un-
related individuals to live together at all, whereas barring them from the one
square mile of Belle Terre would not.214 This is a troubled area: At some point
to burden a way of life sufficiently is to prohibit. That point probably is to be
found at regulations which hinder the ability of those who pursue certain goals to
get a job or to earn a living.215 In this area, the cases go both ways.21
Other cases turn on their proximity to the core concept of bodily integrity.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit has held unconstitutional in Huguez a rectal search,
based on "mere suspicion," made at the Mexican border,2 17 and has held in
York that a female assault victim whom policemen forced to pose for nude
photographs which they then circulated had her constitutional rights violated.21
But the same court, in Baker, refused to hold that a person whom the police in-
vestigated and then made false statements about to a local radio station had had
his constitutional rights infringed even though he lost his job because of the
libel.219 That "invasion of privacy," said the court, "is not... so flagrant that it
calls for invocation of the Constitution.""22 Although in both Baker and York
(but not Huguez), plaintiff's privacy was infringed in the Warren-Brandeis sense,
there was no invasion of bodily integrity in Baker as there was in York2" and
Huguez.
222
Finally, the courts are more disposed to offer protection when the state
makes it more difficult for a specific individual to hold or act on any values or
214 Of course, if a large city did this, or if all villages did, different problems would be
presented. In Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), Providence Township,
Pennsylvania, was not allowed to implement a zoning scheme where "nowhere in the Town-
ship are apartments permitted," for this would "close its doors" to apartment dwellers. Provi-
dence was a town of 13,000; Belle Terre was a village of 700 people. See Vickers v. Township
Comnm'n, 37 N.J. 232, 252, 181 A.2d 129, 140 (1962) (Hall, J., dissenting).
215 See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YAx.n L.J. 733 (1964).
216 Compare Braunfeld v. Braun, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) (Sunday closing); Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory leave for pregnant teachers five
months before expected birth overbroad; must be case by case determination of whether the
teacher is incapacitated from teaching); Gutierrez v. Laird, 346 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1972)
(discharge of pregnant officers by Army allowed; this dbes not prohibit having children, only
being an Air Force officer at the same time).
217 Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968).
218 York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
219 Baker v. Howard, 419 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1969).
220 Id. at 377.
221 Although the policemen in York did not tear the clothes from York's body, their order-
ing her to strip against her will is virtually the same thing.
222 In the recent case of California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1730d, 1951-59, and 35 U.S.C. §§ 1051-62, 1081-
83, 1101-05, 1121-22, which required banks to microfilm checks over $100 and report domestic
transactions over $10,000, was held constitutional. There was no touching of the body here.
The Act was not an attempt to impose a morality but to detect embezzlement and other
crimes. Nor did the Act make pursuance of an identifiable way of life impossible, although,
as the dissents pointed out, it was as much of a burden on unpopular causes as the state
actions struck down in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). What was involved was
the Warren-Brandeis concept of privacy as the right not to have one's private affairs made
public as in Baker. The Court also avoided the argument that the bank records could be used
to disclose the identities of members of unpopular organizations, saying it was premature as
there was no "concrete fact situation" in which such disclosure was sought by the Govern-
ment. 416 U.S. at 55-57, 75-76. Similar reasoning is used with regard to Army data banks
in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1972). Of course, future trends could change these
holdings, which have been likened to Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See
Comment, supra note 190, at 292-93.
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goals at all (fourth criterion). This was apparent in Roe.13 It is even more
evident in cases where the state seeks to confine someone, for confinement makes
virtually any way of life harder to pursue. Thus, in extending procedural safe-
guards to state proceedings to confine juvenile delinquents over the state's objec-
tion that it was acting in the child's interest, the Supreme Court stated:
[Hjowever euphemistic the title, a receiving home or an industrial school
for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incar-
cerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes "a building with
whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours .... ,224
In the cases described above, the courts have granted protection to autonomy
by many methods. They have often employed careful scrutiny of the facts to find
,that the intrusion bears no relation to the state's purpose; 22 sometimes, they have
held the state's purpose illegitimate.22 Often, the Supreme Court has used
language which suggests that not every purpose which would legitimate economic
action would be enough to allow infringement of autonomy, even if rationally
calculated to advance it. Several cases say that a "compelling state interest" 27 is
required "where fundamental liberties are involved," ' or "[w]here there is a
significant encroachment upon personal liberty. ' 29 Many cases state that a
compelling interest is necessary to override the freedoms guaranteed by the first
amendment;2 0 and, as language in many of these and other cases suggests,22'
this is because the first amendment is the portion of the Bill of Rights most
essential to self-determination and the freedom to develop one's own values.
Several other important characteristics of the courts' protection of auton-
omy must be noted. First of all, any restriction on autonomy is analyzed incre-
mentally: If there are alternative restrictions yielding similar benefits, the state
will be required to utilize the least restrictive alternative, inasmuch as the incre-
mental (marginal) gain in enacting a more drastic alternative would be out-
weighed by the marginal intrusion. The government's purpose,
223 See text accompanying note 195 supra.
224 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967). See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32-33
(1972) (right to counsel extended to misdemeanor); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64,
365-66 (1970); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) (defendant in criminal cases
has "an interest of transcending value," his liberty).
225 See e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
226 See e.g., Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557 (1969); United States Dep't of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
227 The phrase comes from NAACP v. Button. 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
228 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
229 Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 '(1960). Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of a constitu-
tional right is unconstitutional unless shown "necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest").
230 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 639 (1943) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); People v. Woody, 61 Cal.
2d 716, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964).
231 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) '(foundation of free government by free
men); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (shield under which "many types
of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested"); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945) ("indispensable democratic freedom"); cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Stone in United States v. Carolene Products, 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), hints that a preferred position is necessary to protect "discrete and
insular minorities" and this may include those with unusual ways of life.
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even if it is legitimate--cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
23 2
Indeed, the whole area of procedural due process may be derived from this
incremental approach; in Goldberg v. Kelly,233 Justice Brennan said:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is
influenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned to suffer grievous
loss," . . . and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding
that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.
23 4
Furthermore, it would seem that a state intrusion, even in pursuit of a
compelling interest, loses much of its justification if its effectiveness in achieving
the state's goal is low or uncertain.235
IV. Civil Commitment and the Right to Refuse Treatment
This section will examine how the constitutional framework set out in the
preceding section should be applied, using the facts in the first section, to a
patient's right to refuse treatment and to civil commitment in general. Before
this application is made it may be helpful to examine what the courts have al-
ready done in this area and in the closely related area of treatment of physical
ailments.
A. What the Courts Have Done
The determination that an individual needs care or treatment has tradi-
tionally been held a proper state purpose, and one sufficiently important
to justify involuntary commitment."' The two other state interests usually cited
are the individual's danger to others and his danger to himself.3 7 Need for treat-
ment until very recently went virtually unchallenged as a legitimate basis for the
state's power; indeed, the Supreme Court observed in this connection that "it
is ... remarkable that the substantive constitutional limitations on this power
have not been more frequently litigated.""23  However, in Lessard v. Schmidt,"9
232 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 U.S. 11,
18 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512-14 (1964). See also discussion
in Ratner, supra note 96.
233 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
234 Id. at 262-63 (citation omitted).
235 See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537 (1973) (justifica-
tion of preventing fraud weakened because it could be evaded quite easily); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (rationality of justification of
preventing extramarital relations "dubious" because of the "admitted widespread availability"
of contraceptives). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1972).
236 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972). See also Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493
F.2d 507, 520 '(5th Cir. 1974), and sources cited therein; Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness,
and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE. L.J. 87, 92-93 (1967).
237 406 U.S. at 737; 493 F.2d at 520.
238 406 U.S. at 737.
239 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), judgment vacated sub nom. Schmidt v. Lessard,
414 U.S. 473 (1974), because the terms of the injunctive relief granted were not specific
enough. The district court entered a new judgment, which again required a finding of danger-
ousness. Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
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a class action broadly contesting the validity of the Wisconsin civil commitment
procedures, the district court construed the Wisconsin statutes to require "a
finding of 'dangerousness' to self or others,"24 and suggested that need for treat-
ment would not be a sufficient justification for depriving an individual of his
liberty.24' After Lessard the courts of three states have held that need for treat-
ment is not a compelling enough interest to permit confinement and that com-
mitment must be justified on a basis of dangerousness to self or to others. 2
Because of the magnitude of the intrusion on autonomy, even those courts
which have not dealt with the issue of whether need for treatment is a sufficient
basis for commitment do not hesitate to examine the facts of confinement and
treatment rather than accept the state's or hospital's characterization of the
circumstances.4 ' Several courts have applied the least restrictive alternative
test24 both to the decision whether to commit a person to a mental hospital245
and to "alternate dispositions within a mental hospital." 4' There has also been
an emphasis on requiring adequate procedural safeguards, in part because of
fear of the "terrifying possibility that the [person] may not be mentally ill at
all." ' This requirement reached the level of a constitutional right after Gault
swept away the distinction between treatment and punishment and pointed out
that such safeguards are needed because the state seeks to curtail the individual's
freedom of choice.14V Thus, some cases have supplemented the statutory commit-
ment procedure by requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt at commitment
hearings 4" or by giving the individual the right to counsel. 50 This protection
given individuals whom the state seeks to commit has been extended in a number
240 349 F. Supp. at 1093; 379 F. Supp. at 1379.
241 349 F. Supp. at 1093-94. In Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D.
Pa. 1971), in which the Pennsylvania procedures for civil commitment were found lacking in
due process and a consent decree implemented by the court required a finding of danger-
ousness.
242 People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974); In re Levias, 83
Wash. 2d 253, 517 P.2d 588, 591 (1973); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 123
(W. Va. 1974).
243 Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 526 n.47 (5th Cir. 1974). Compare text and
cases accompanying notes 157-60 supra.
244 See text accompanying note 232 supra.
245 Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378,
392 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Welsch v.
Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 501 (D. Minn. 1974); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966,
973 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
246 Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F.
Supp. 1196, 1206 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y.2d 161, 305 N.E.2d
903, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1973).
247 United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1078 (2d Cir. 1969). This
movement for procedural safeguards dates back over one hundred years. See Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1086 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
248 See text accompanying note 224 supra. See Quesnell v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517
P.2d 568 (1974). The counterargument was that a full hearing would traumatize the patient.
249 In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 650 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Cf. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 369
F. Supp. 628, 630 (N.D. Ill. 1973); People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d
733 (1974).
250 Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1086 (1st Cir. 1973) ; Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp.
378, 389 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (counsel must be made available "well before the day of the final
commitment hearing"); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (counsel required
to commit a person as mentally retarded); Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (E.D.
Wis. 1974), 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1097 (1972); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966,
974 (M.D. Pa. 1971); People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270
N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966); In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851 (1974).
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of other cases to prisoners whose transfer to mental hospitals is sought,25 ' to those
acquitted of crimes by reason of insanity, 52 to those convicted under sexual
psychopath laws,2"2 and to those found incompetent to stand trial."" There has
also been success with broad-based attacks on commitment statutes as failing
to provide adequate procedures, and the opinions in these cases set forth in detail
a whole panoply of required procedures. 5 5
There has been some litigation on the rights of civilly committed mental
patients and others confined by the state to refuse certain forms of treatment
which the institution thinks will be therapeutic and beneficial for them. From
the general discussion of autonomy, it would seem that the right to refuse treat-
ment would be more likely to be recognized, the more drastic and the more
destructive of self-determination the treatment, the more controversial and experi-
mental the treatment (for this would make the benefits less certain) and the
closer treatment seems to punishment (because such "treatment" would be more
like the imposition of morality and would be viewed by the courts as less likely
to be therapeutic). This pattern has been more or less followed.
In most states, mental patients may not refuse electroshock therapy or sur-
gery.25 However, in Kaimowitz v. Deyt of Mental Health," a Michigan court
held that psychosurgery on an involuntarily committed mental patient would
violate his constitutional rights. The court noted that psychosurgery is "irrever-
sible and intrusive, often leads to the blunting of emotions . . . and limits the
ability to generate new ideas," and stated that "if the First Amendment protects
the freedom to express ideas, it necessarily follows that it must protect the free-
dom to generate ideas. Without the latter protection, the former is meaningless."
The court also took into account the fact that the surgery was experimental,
posed unknown risks, and was not even known to be beneficial.
A few states have dealt with the problem of psychosurgery by statute.5 '
California and New York statutes now require consent for shock treatment if
the patient is competent,255 and Massachusetts requires consent unless there is
251 Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); United States ex tel. Schuster v. Herold,
410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969).
252 Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
253 Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966); State ex tel. Farrell v. Stovall,
59 Wis. 2d 148, 207 N.W.2d 809 (1973). Cf. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
254 State ex rel. Haskins v. County Court, 62 Wis. 2d 250, 214 N.W.2d 575 (1974) ; State
ex tel. Matalik v. Schubert, 57 Wis. 2d 315, 204 N.W.2d 13 (1973).
255 Kendall v. True,- F. Supp.- (W.D. Ky. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378
(M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), 349 F. Supp. 1078 (1972);
Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971). Cf. Davis v. Watkins, 384 F.
Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Fhagen v. Miller, 306 F. Supp. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); State
ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 269 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1954).
256 See ACLU, HANDBOoK: TnE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 69-70 (B. Ennis & L.
Siegel eds. 1973).
257 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973). The factual back-
ground to Kaimowitz is found in Robitscher, supra note 39, at 20-24.
258 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5325 (West Supp. 1974); N.Y. MENT. HYG.
LAW § 15.03 (McKinney Supp. 1974). Both California and New York require the consent
of the patient or his guardian for surgery. See also OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5123.03 (Page
1970), which requires the patient, his doctor, and his guardian to be notified prior to "any
major operation"; and MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 23 (1972).
259 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5325, 5326.4 (West Supp. 1974); N.Y. MENT. HYG.
LAW § 15.03 (McKinney Supp. 1974). On December 30, 1974, a Superior Court in San
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"good cause" for ECT and the patient's guardian or nearest relative consents.2"'
One New York case 61 decided just before the New York statutes went into effect,
noted that ECT "is the subject of great controversy within the psychiatric pro-
fession, both as to its efficacy, and as to its dangers,"2 2 and refused to issue an
order authorizing ECT for a competent patient who refused consent. And the
district court decree in Wyatt v. Stickney2 gave patients at Bryce Hospital a
right "not to be subjected to treatment procedure such as lobotomy, electro-
convulsive treatment without their express and informed consent"; the court
referred to this decree as the constitutional minimum.
264
The cases on nonconsensual chemotherapy are divided. In Mackey v.
Procunier"' and Knecht u. Gillman,2" the courts dealt with the use of
"aversive stimuli" for behavior therapy by mental institutions."' In both cases,
these programs involved the administration of drugs which produced great pain
to inmates who misbehaved in order to change their behavior.2 16  The courts held
these programs violated the constitutional rights of the patients.269 Other cases
have held that the forcible use of tranquilizers to control behavior-i e., to
sedate the patients-might violate the patient's constitutional rights2  On the
other hand, some courts have upheld such sedation in prison mental hospitals,27
and one case has implied that hospitals have a duty to administer "modem tran-
quilizing drugs" even if the patient refuses them. 2  None of these cases question
the hospital's power to force therapeutic drugs upon the patient.
The Second Circuit decision in Winters v. Miller"' is particularly significant.
The court there held that it violated the constitutional rights of plaintiff, whose
religious beliefs would not allow her to take medicines, when a hospital forced
her to take medication, where she had been temporarily committed as mentally
ill but not found incompetent. The court in Winters observed that "if we were
dealing . . . with an ordinary patient suffering from a physical ailment, the
hospital authorities would have no right to impose compulsory medical treatment
against the patient's will, and . . . to do so would constitute . . . battery."
274
Diego issued a restraining order on the California law on the grounds that it restricted the
patient's freedom of choice. TimE, Jan. 20, 1974, at 56.
260 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 23 (1972). This law also applies to lobotomies.
261 Health and Hosps. Corp. v. Stein, 70 Misc. 2d 944, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1972).
262 Id. at 945, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
263 344 F. Supp. 373, 380 (M.D. Ala. 1972) aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974). The decree for Partlow Hospital was slightly different. It allowed
ECT "in extraordinary circumstances to prevent self-mutilation . . . only after alternative
techniques have failed." Id. at 387, 401.
264 Id. at 376.
265 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
266 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
267 The institution in Mackey was a prison medical facility (Vacaville).
268 488 F.2d at 1137; 477 F.2d at 878 n.1.
269 Mackey was an appeal from a dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, so the court did not
enjoin the program, as in Knecht, but rather remanded for trial.
270 Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 503 (D. Minn. 1974); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F.
Supp. 451, 455 (N.D. Ind. 1973).
271 Haynes v. Harris, 344 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1965); Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F. Supp. 329
(W.D. Mo. 1968); Veals v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 1017 (W.D. Mo. 1968). Peek and Veals
were decided by the same judge, and Haynes affirmed a decision by that judge.
272 Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
273 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971).
274 Id. at 68.
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Indeed, in this closely related area, the courts have quite firmly upheld bodily
integrity and self-determination. As one court put it:
[A] person . . . has the right, in the exercise of control over his own body,
to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment ...
[T]o the physician ... the particular treatment which should be undertaken
may seem evident, but it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician,
to determine for himself the direction in which he believes his interests
lie.
27 5
Many courts have upheld self-determination even when the patient refused life-
saving treatment for religious276 or other 17 reasons, although some courts have
refused to do so, especially where minor children were involved."",
B. Autonomy and Treatment
Forcible treatment is characterized by those features which, as shown above,
impel courts to grant protection to autonomy. First of all, coerced injection of
tranquilizers or ECT are nonconsensual touchings of the patient's body and
thus infringe the core of bodily integrity. Second, to compel treatment may be
to impose values. For the state to declare that someone needs treatment when
he does not agree is in itself an imposition of the state's value scheme. Even if
this is untrue, treatment may still be the imposition of morality where, as is
sometimes the case,279 the individual is picked for treatment because of his de-
viant or socially offensive way of life.
Third, imposed treatment may make it impossible for the patient to act
on a specific value. This is clearly true if, for religious or other reasons, he be-
lieves that medication and treatment are evil.25 0 It is also true if the patient is
picked for treatment because of his lifestyle and is prevented by confinement
and treatment from shaping his life in the way he prefers. The effects of treat-
ment may make a specific lifestyle impossible. Major tranquilizers, as well as
ECT, may make the independent, questioning, and even combative patient pli-
able and cooperative.28 1 Psychosurgery may make an exuberant, active child
quiet and docile.'
Finally, it is dear that treatment may make it more difficult for the patient
to hold or act on any values at all. Several forms of treatment impair ability to
think, choose, and have goals. It has been shown that this is true of major tran-
quilizers, especially when large doses are given or when side effects like akathisia
275 Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513-14, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10
(1972). See also Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
276 In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44
Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962).
277 In re Nemster, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
278 This area has received extensive comment. See, e.g., Cantor, A Patient's Decision to
Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26
RucmERs L. Rav. 228 (1973) and Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE
L.J. 1632 (1974), for a comprehensive discussion of the case law in this area.
279 See text accompanying notes 13-14, 68, 79, 93-94 supra.
280 As in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), and Winters v. Miller,
446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971); both cases involving Christian Scientists.
281 See text accompanying notes 22, 39 supra.
282 See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra.
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occur,2"  of minor tranquilizers,28 and, less clearly, of antidepressant drugs.85
Very careful supervision of the patients is necessary to determine the correct
dosage of all these drugs;2se if the wrong dosage is given, the impairment of
intellect will be even greater. BCT also impairs the patient's ability to remember
and thus to hold values or act on those values that he had chosen; this impair-
ment may be permanent.2 67 Psychosurgery even more clearly may cause irrever-
sible damage to the patient's capacity for feeling and thinking.2 1"
Since forcible treatment meets all four criteria so clearly, the tradition of
protection for autonomy mandates that the courts carefully scrutinize the reality
of treatment and determine whether there is a state interest sufficiently com-
pelling to allow this violation of autonomy. Those that have been suggested
are the individual's need for treatment and his dangerousness. " Both of these
are made less compelling by (1) the uncertainty of diagnosis of mental illness
and dangerousness; 290 (2) the fact that psychiatrists in practice prefer to find
sickness or dangerousness where none is present rather than risk letting a sick
or dangerous person go untreated ;291 and (3) the all too summary nature of the
commitment process in most states. " ' All of these factors indicate that only a
fraction of those individuals who are committed need treatment or are dangerous.
The need-for-treatment rationale is further weakened by the ineffectiveness
of the various treatments presently available. Some specific forms of depression
may be helped by antidepressant drugs or EQT.293 Some of the more striking
symptoms of schizophrenia may be helped by major tranquilizers.298 Outside of
depression, ECT is of little benefit.295 The present state of knowledge of psycho-
surgery is such that its benefits in a specific case are uncertain and questionable.29
With these limited exceptions, chemotherapy, ECT, and psychosurgery will not
benefit the patient or help repair the abnormality in his mental processes, al-
though they will make him more docile and easier to manage.
In addition, need-for-treatment as a rationale for involuntary hospitalization
is undermined because, first, none of the effective treatments require hospital-
ization. Tranquilizers, antidepressants and even ECT may be given on an out-
patient basis. Secondly, hospitalization, especially if for longer than a year or
two, is antitherapeutic. Instead of alleviating mental disorders, long term hos-
pitalization may aggravate them.297 Even short term hospitalization, given the
depersonalizing ambience that prevails in most mental hospitals, will too often
aggravate rather than cure.298 Thirdly, even if the treatment given in a hospital
283 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
284 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
285 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
286 See text accompanying notes 23, 31 supra.
287 See text accompanying notes 40-44 supra.
288 See text accompanying notes 64-66, 70 supra.
289 See text accompanying notes 236-37 supra.
290 See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
291 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
292 See text accompanying notes 78-94 supra.
293 See text accompanying notes 29-30, 37 supra.
294 See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
295 See text accompanying note 38 supra.
296 See text accompanying notes 63-66 supra.
297 See text at note 72 supra.
298 See text accompanying note 73 supra.
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were to cure the patient, the hospital staff would, given the uncertain state of
diagnosis of mental illness and the conservatism of psychiatrists, too often be
unaware that the patient should be released and would continue to confine
him.
299
It will, however, be objected that self-determination and freedom of choice
presuppose an ability to choose. Mentally ill people do not have such ability;
thus, for them, freedom of choice becomes meaningless.
It would, it is true, be a mockery to say that a person so overwhelmed by
psychosis that he is totally unaware of what is going on around him cannot be
treated without his consent. But it follows from the earlier discussion that many
people who are committed have the capacity to understand the choice and make
a meaningful decision. Clearly, those who are committed but who do not belong
in a mental hospital have such capacity."' Even those who are mentally ill do
not ipso facto lose their ability to choose. To conclude otherwise would be, as
an empirical matter, "far too simplistic."' ' This has been recognized by both
courts and legislatures. Thus, the laws of most states distinguish between com-
mitment and incompetence and state that the latter is not necessarily entailed by
the former."0 2 Courts have allowed mental patients to make wills 3. and to refuse
consent to lifesaving operations.'0 4 The legislatures of New York, California,
and Massachusetts have affirmed the ability of many mental patients to make
choices in this very area, by requiring consent for ECT."'0
Several factors militate against a strict standard of ability to choose which
would impute capacity to relatively few patients and in favor of a lower standard.
Because treatment is so often not only ineffective,"'0 but may even have destruc-
tive impact,0 7 the harm that will be done by denying treatment to a patient who
is not competent to choose is far outweighed by the damage done by imposing
treatment on a patient who is able to choose. Furthermore, the tendency in this
area of appliers of standards to expand them' 8 suggests that a strict standard
of ability to choose will become in practice so rigid as to subvert the right to refuse
treatment entirely. This contention is strengthened by the fact that the psycho-
analytic theory of resistance, in which the psychiatrists who would apply the
299 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
300 See text accompanying notes 195-98 supra. See also Iowa estimate that 52 percent were
capable of choice, Iowa at 918, and KITTRIE, supra note 73, at 79 (most people confined in
mental hospitals are not psychotic).
301 Shapiro, supra note 96, at 308-09, and sources cited therein. Note, supra note 74. at
1214 and sources cited therein.
In In re Buttonow, 23 N.Y.2d 385, 394, 297 N.Y.S.2d 97, 104, 244 N.E.2d 677, 682
(1968), the court stated that even "[ain adjudication of incompetency is in no way a decision
or judgment that the person so adjudicated may not act in matters involving his personal
status."
302 See Brakel & Rock, supra note 74, at 250-53; Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d
Cir. 1971) ; Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1206 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
303 See Weihofen, Mental Incompetency to Make a Will, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 89
(1967). Cf. Note, Competency to Contract, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 505 (1970).
304 In re Yetter, Civil No. 1973-533, Northampton County, Pennsylvania.
305 See text accompanying notes 259-60 supra. See also court decisions at text accompany-
ing notes 261-63, 273.
306 See text accompanying notes 293-96 supra. For antidepressant drugs, which are quite
effective and not as destructive, a stricter standard may be used.
307 See text accompanying notes 279-88 supra.
308 See text accompanying notes 91-92 supra.
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RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT
standard are thoroughly trained, suggests that, because unconscious neurotic
forces resist treatment, no one is capable of making a meaningful choice to refuse
treatment.30 9
This article has sought to demonstrate that imposition of treatment on a
patient who refuses it violates the core concepts of self-determination and bodily
integrity and that the benefits obtained are often very uncertain. If there is, as
this suggests, a right to refuse treatment, it follows that one cannot involuntarily
commit a person because he is in need of treatment. Since he has refused treat-
ment (for the commitment is involuntary), he cannot be forcibly treated, and
the reason for his confinement disappears. This must, to be sure, be qualified
to permit commitment for treatment of a person so overwhelmed by psychosis
that he cannot comprehend the choice. But this exception must be strictly ap-
plied; otherwise, as is all too often the case with present statutory standards such
as dangerousness, the exception may be used to cover almost all mental patients.
V. Conclusion
What Judge Bazelon recently said in another connection is appropriate to
the subject discussed in this article:
The life of the law in this area is thus surely not logic. I would be less con-
cerned if I were sure it was experience; however, surveying the field after
twenty-five years of work, I have serious doubts that the experience . . .
really [was] the cause of all this startling, even radical departure from our
traditions.3 0
The law governing civil commitment and treatment is grounded neither on
logic nor experience. It is based upon a priori assumptions and post hoc rational-
izations which accord neither with the medical realities of mental iliness nor
with the way in which commitment and treatment operate in practice. "Mental
illness is mental illness," declares a federal court, "whether it afflicts the criminal
or the king." ' As this article has shown, the constitutional issue is deeper than
that of legal equality. The core question is that .of protection of the autonomy
of both criminal and king afflicted by mental illness. Constitutionally protected
autonomy creates a zone of immunity from governmental constraint that, as has
been shown, includes immunity from forcible mental treatment. The "liberty"
secured by the Constitution may no longer mean Adam Smith; but, in this area
at least, it still means John Stuart Mill.3 2
It will be objected that the approach urged would sweep away a jurispru-
dence of centuries. By now, "The egg is too thoroughly scrambled for judicial
unscrambling." 13 The alternative, it will be said, is a veritable "gaol delivery"
that would all but empty mental institutions and strip society of its power to
deal with the mentally ill.
This is the type of "scare" argument which has been used against most law
reforms from Beccaria to Miranda and Furman.1 4 The question is not that of
309 See S. FRaUD, A GFNERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS (1917).
310 Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
311 United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1089 (2d Cir. 1969).
312 Compare Henkin, supra note 96 at 1425, 1417.
313 Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
314 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238 '(1972).
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how many people would be released from commitment or vested with the right
to refuse treatment, but that of how many are committed or treated against their
will improperly. According to a recent estimate, 250,000 people face commit-
ment proceedings each year. 15 The previous discussion has shown that those
proceedings are too frequently conducted without adherence to elementary pro-
cedural safeguards. In practice, commitment proceedings are virtually ex parte,
with hearings discretionary, superficial, or summary. Even the elementary right
to effective counsel is one that is most often honored in the breach.
Procedural reforms thus become a categorical imperative in commitment
cases. These should be accompanied by a more explicit statutory definition of
dangerousness, by a stricter burden of proof, and by a requirement that commit-
ment be ordered only if there is no less restrictive alternative feasible. The flexi-
bility with which the courts have used the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to
protect personal autonomy suggests that such reforms could be implemented
judicially by broad-based attacks on the constitutionality of state commitment
statutes with the courts giving detailed relief in their decrees. 16
Reform of commitment proceedings will leave unresolved the problem of
those subjected to mental treatment. The inadequate and inhumane conditions
in too many hospitals and institutions, as well as the ineffectiveness of most
forms of treatment, should caution against continuing a power of forcible treat-
ment over those in commitment. Any harm to society if the right to refuse treat-
ment is recognized is surely outweighed by the infringement of autonomy of
those still having ability to choose, if not by the positive injury all too often
caused to those subjected to forcible treatment.
The present system of commitment and treatment "is worse than a crime,
it is a blunder." It not only violates basic constitutional rights; it does not even
work. This is only a legal article, and a Dickens is needed to describe the miasma
of inhumanity and injustice in which mental treatment is mired:
[I]t so exhausts finances, patience, courage, hope, so overthrows the brain
and breaks the heart, that there is not an honourable man among its prac-
titioners who would not give . .. the warning, "Suffer any wrong that can
be done you rather than come here!"
3 s17
But it does not take a Dickens to state the necessity for drastic legal changes to
ensure that even mentally ill people remain people. Under the present system,
they have become statistics. One thing, at any rate, is certain: While the commit-
ment and treatment system remains unchanged, it is one which makes skeptics
of us all.315
315 Weiss & Villafane, Abused by the System, 5 Jusus DoCoR 26 (1975).
316 Cf. cases in note 255 supra. One much-discussed procedural reform is New York's
Mental Health Information Service, a state agency whose task is to ensure that patients are
adequately represented in the commitment process. This agency is doing its job quite well and
similar agencies could be set up in other states as part of a plan for making their commitment
procedures constitutionally acceptable. This proposal is made in much greater detail by Adel-
man & Chambers, supra note 78, at 75-86. For empirical studies of the effectiveness of the
MHIS, see id. at 64-72; Gupta, New York's Mental Health Information Service: An Experi-
ment in Due Process, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 405 (1971).
317 C. DICKENS, BLEAK HousE.
318 Compare Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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